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This paper examines how negative shocks to arms imports due to external 
arms embargoes affect the military expenditure, quality of democracy and 
internal and external conflicts in a sample of 48 mainly developing countries 
for the period of 1990–2017. An important innovation is that we include both 
political and conflict factors in a Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) model 
of arms sanctions. The results show that the responses of political system and 
different indices of democracy including electoral, liberal, participatory, 
deliberative, and egalitarian democracy to decreases in arms imports (as a 
percentage of GDP) are positive and statistically significant, and that of 
military expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) is negative and significant. 
Furthermore, our findings show that while arms restrictions do not 
significantly impact on religious tensions and external conflicts, they may 
intensify ethnic tensions and internal conflicts in developing countries. Overall 
the results indicate that arms embargo weakens the military sector by creating 
the negative impact on military expenditure and the size of armed forces and 
destabilizes the government. Although this improves democratic characteristics 
in developing countries, it may lead to higher ethnic tensions and internal 
conflict. In contrast to military expenditures, the responses of education 
expenditures, health expenditures and GDP per capita to negative shocks in 
arms imports are positive. The overall results are robust to different definitions 
of arms shocks, and different indicators of political institutions (V-DEM 
democracy indices and polity2), as well as differing orderings of variables in the 
panel VAR system. 
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The impact of external arms restrictions on 
democracy and conflict in developing countries 1 
1 Introduction 
The Dutch economist, Jan Tinbergen, the first (joint) winner of the Nobel 
prize in economics stressed the inseparability of economic welfare and security; 
see Tinbergen and Fischer (1987). Thus, welfare and security go hand in hand. 
Excessive security, however, can become a tool in the hands of authoritarian 
regimes whose insecure legitimacy can lead them to exercise coercive and 
repressive measures on their citizenry. This can be a cause for concern for the 
global community who may exercise sanctions on oppressive regimes with a 
view to changing their behaviour. The literature on sanctions is not new; see 
Galtung (1967) on it, and Hufbauer et. Al (2007) on economic sanctions. This 
paper will be concerned with the effects of a particular type of external 
sanction, controls on arms imports, on democratic development on a cross 
section of developing countries. In doing this we will employ an untried 
econometric technique, panel vector autoregressive techniques (PVAR). This 
method is more dynamic than static panel data analysis and has advantages 
over other commonly used dynamic panel data techniques such as the 
generalised method of moments (GMM). Secondly, we utilise a new and novel 
data set on democracy emanating from the varieties of democracy (V-DEM) 
data base, which analyses many of the complex processes behind democratic 
development, including the distinction between the liberal and electoral aspects 
of democracy. 
The literature on the efficacy of sanctions suggests that they are broadly a 
failure from the standpoint of the sender country or multilateral agency. 
Specifically, it is argued and demonstrated in the empirical literature that 
sanctions worsen repression in authoritarian regimes; Allen and Letzkian 
(2013), Peksen (2009). It is also suggested that sanctions worsen the 
democratic credentials of targeted countries, Peksen and Drury (2010). This is 
because sanctions result in authoritarian regimes withdrawing on themselves, 
becoming more nationalistic and more willing to impose hardships on 
segments of their population. On the other hand, it is argued, Blad (2019) for 
example, that the effect of sanctions on state repression is mediated by the 
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degree of democracy already present in the targeted nation. Thus, sanctions 
will not cause such a repressive response in more democratic states. Other 
studies pointed to the positive impact of sanctions on the political situation in 
target countries (Dizaji 2019 a, Dizaji 2019 b). Dizaji and Bergeijk (2013) use 
vector autoregressive (VAR) models to investigate the impact of oil sanctions 
both on economic and political indices of Iran. Their empirical analysis reveals 
that oil sanctions impose economic costs that motivate the target country to 
change its political behavior positively in first 2-3 years. However, they argue 
that the positive political outcome of sanctions can be significant in initial 
phase and may turn negative in the end. Dizaji (2019 b) simulates the military 
and political impact of oil sanctions on a group of oil-dependent countries in 
the Middle East. He finds that negative oil shocks caused by sanctions may 
increase the military burden and induce repressive policies in the short run. 
However increasing financial pressures on the target country’s budget may 
finally compel it to reduce military burden and become politically more 
flexible. Gershenson (2002) indicates that sanctions that create considerable 
damage on the target regimes may impel them to end conflict. However, 
sanctions with a minor impact on the target economy may be 
counterproductive, provoking more aggressive behavior by the target regime. 
Strandow (2006) discusses that arms embargoes can probably reduce the 
likelihood of conflict, while the threatened and imposed non-military sanctions 
maybe ineffective in resolving the conflict. Allen (2008) and Grauvogel et al 
(2014) point to the the destabilizing impact of sanctions on political situation 
of the target countries through triggering antigovernment protests. Dizaji and 
Farzanegan (2019) demonstrate that the final impact of sanctions on the 
military expenditures of the target depends on the relative size of the security 
effect and income effect caused by the sanctions. If the security impact on the 
target is strong, but decreases in financial resources are not substantial, then 
sanctions will probably increase military expenditure and vice-versa. 
For developing countries, there is also a related question of the effect of 
military expenditure on their development. Military expenditure may provide 
security, but does it promote or hamper economic growth. Deger and Sen 
(1990) argue that military expenditure could crowd out more productive 
education and health expenditure, which not only enhance welfare but also 
promote growth. These may out-weigh any positive externalities of military 
expenditure on growth, such as backward linkages of the arms industry 
towards other sectors and technical spin-offs to civilian sectors. The survey of 
military expenditure and growth in developing countries by Dunne and Tian 
(2013) suggests that there is a consensus in the literature on the negative effects 
of military expenditure on growth in developing countries. In a study on 
Pakistan, Murshed and Saleh (2013) find that military expenditure can have a 
truly negative effect on human capital accumulation, which has adverse effects 
on the development of manufacturing capacity, but also via promoting external 
indebtedness, which creates the burden of debt servicing. In a cross-sectional 
analysis Yakovlev (2007) finds that the negative effects of military expenditure 
on growth diminish somewhat if the nation is an arms exporter. Smith and 
Tasiran (2005) look at the arms trade, finding that in cross-sectional analysis 
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the demand for arms imports declines at some point of inflexion as military 
expenditure increases.    
Then there is the question of military expenditure and the development of 
state capacity. In the developing world state capacity is important to the overall 
development process, as private markets cannot be relied on to deliver 
important public goods such as health and education. Political sociologists, 
such as Charles Tilly (1992), have pointed out the role of war in state building, 
asserting that in the historical European context the need for ever more 
complex military establishments necessitated enhanced state capacity, including 
fiscal capacity, leading to the state’s increased ability to provide a growing array 
of public goods, as well its role in economic management. Hostility towards 
external enemies may cement state capacity, and assist in nation building, as it 
can form the basis for fiscal and legal institutions. This may, however, not 
apply to internal conflict, which tends to undermine institutions, and the 
provision of public goods.  The last quarter of the 20th century witnessed 
growth and development failure in many parts of the developing world 
(especially in Africa), along with a decline in state capacity in many developing 
countries, and several of these nations have also experienced civil war, which 
also further reduces state capacity. Other developing countries are 
characterized by factionalism, with governments, even democratically elected 
ones, serving particular group interests. These societies have little interest in 
providing common interest public goods to the citizenry as a whole, but 
instead concentrate on using the state’s resources to reward their own faction 
via political patronage. In short, it is important to look at the impact of 
external sanctions in the form of arms imports on state capacity in the form of 
government expenditure, as well as the military, education and health 
expenditure components.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes 





2   Research design 
2.1 Data description 
We apply a panel of annual data for 48 developing countries that covers the 
period from 1990 to 2017. The list of countries is mentioned in Appendix. To 
examine the dynamic interrelations among arms imports, political conditions, 
and the military spending, the following variables are used: 
- Military variables: arms imports to GDP ratio (armimp), military 
expenditures to GDP ratio (milex) and the ratio of armed forces personnel 
to total labor force (armforc). 
- Political variables: military in politics index (militpolit), government stability 
index (govsrabil), polity 2 index (polity), Varieties of democracy indices. 
- Conflict variables: Internal conflict (intconflict), external conflict (exconflict), 
ethnic tensions (ethnic) and religious tensions (religious) indices.  
- Other control variables for robustness analysis: GDP per capita (gdpperc), 
the ratio of general government total expenditures to GDP (govex), the ratio 
of government expenditure on education to GDP (eduex), the ratio of 
domestic general government health expenditure to GDP (healthex). 
 
The data on military variables, GDP per capita, health and education 
expenditures are gathered from World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI) online database (World Bank, 2019). The data on general government 
total expenditures are from International Monetary Fund’s World Economic 
Outlook Database (October 2019). The Polity2 index (polity) is commonly used 
to measure the political situation and ranges from − 10 (full autocracy) to 10 
(full democracy). This indicator shows combinations of autocratic and 
democratic characteristics of the political system for different years (Marshall 
et al. 2017). For robustness analysis, we also use different indices of democracy 
provided by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, version 9; these are 
electoral democracy (elecdem), liberal democracy (liberdem), deliberative 
democracy (delibdem), egalitarian democracy (egalitdem), and participatory 
democracy (participdem). All of these democracy indices are ranged between 0 
and 1. Larger values present a better quality of democracy. The V-Dem 
democracy indices are extremely dynamic and capture the changes in politics 
and the quality of different components of democracy from year to year.  
The required conflict data, military in politics and government stability 
data are collected from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  
- govsrabil (Government stability index) is an evaluation both of the 
government’s ability to stay in office, and its ability to carry out its stated 
program(s). It varies from 0 (very high risk) to 12 (very low risk). 
- intconflict (Internal conflict; ranged from 0 to 12) is a measure of political 
violence and its actual or potential impact on governance in the country. 
The highest score stands for a situation that there are no armed or civil 
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opponents to the government and the government does not indulge in 
arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, against its own citizens. 
- exconflict (external conflict measure) measures the risk to the incumbent 
government from foreign action, ranging from non-violent external 
pressure to violent external pressure. It ranges from 0 (very high risk) to 12 
(very low risk). 
- militpolit (military in politics index) ranges from 0 to 6, so that lower scores 
stand for a greater degree of military involvement in politics and a higher 
level of political risk. 
- religious (religious tensions index) ranges from 0 (very high risk) to 6 (very 
low risk). Religious tensions may be due to the domination of society 
and/or governance by a single religious group that wants to substitute 
religious law for civil law and to prevent other religions from the political 
and/or social procedure; the desire of a single religious group to control 
governance; the suppression off religious freedom; the desire of a religious 
group to express its own identity independently and separate from other 
parts of the country. 
- ethnic (ethnic tensions; ranging from 0 to 6) shows the tension within a 
country which is related to the nationality, racial, or language divisions. 
Higher scores represent the lower risks of ethnic tensions. 
2.2 Methodology 
Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) models are applied to examine the 
possible interrelationships among the variables. PVAR modelling is an 
appropriate methodology for the purposes of our research. First, dynamic 
simultaneous relationships can be considered using VAR models. For example, 
these models display the long run variations of political system, military 
spending and conflict over time as affected by shocks to arms imports. Second, 
some interactions between the arms imports, military expenditures, political 
institutions and conflict variations are examined. Considering the lack of a 
priori theory related to the simultaneous relationships among arms imports, 
political system and conflict, the VAR approach is useful as it assumes that all 
variables are endogenous and does not impose any prior restrictions on 
structural relationships among the variables. PVAR model combines the panel-
data model, with the standard VAR model (Love, Zicchino, 2006). The VAR 
method defines the dependent variables on the basis of the predetermined 
lagged variables; hence it is a reduced-form model (Filippaki, Mamatzakis 
2009). This reduced form model is as following:     
 
 (1) 
                                                                            
Where i marks the country, t denotes time=1,…T,   comprises a vector 
of stationary variables, 𝛤(𝐿) denotes a matrix polynomial in the lag operator 
with , 𝜇i is the vector of country specific 
effects and  indicates the disturbance term. Simultaneity does not cause any 
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problem in VAR system and OLS estimations are consistent, because only 
lagged values of the endogenous variables are appeared on the right-hand side 
of the equations. In the standard VAR models, the error terms are generally 
characterized by simultaneous correlations which it enables the response of the 
system to the variations in a particular variable be the response of all those 
variables that have contemporaneous correlation with it. However, this 
simultaneous correlation is settled by the Cholesky orthogonalization 
procedure. The dynamic changes of variables in reaction to shocks in a 
particular variable are explained by impulse response functions (IRFs). 
Therefore, the IRFs allow us to estimate the dynamic impacts of variations in a 
particular variable (for example arms imports) on the other political and 
conflict variables in VAR system. The IRFs enables us to consider the 
magnitude and statistical significance of the impulse responses to one standard 





3  Empirical results 
To avoid spurious regression estimations, we need to test the stationarity of the 
variables before estimating our panel-VAR models. Thus, we test the existence 
of unit roots for the variables. Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Im, Pesaran and 
Shin (2003), Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) are commonly used to 
test the unit roots within the context of panel data. Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) 
suggest a common unit root under the null hypothesis against the alternative of 
stationarity of all individuals, whereas the other tests suppose individual unit 
roots under the null hypothesis. Table 1 reports the results of panel unit root 
tests. We have included a constant but not a time trend (see Dickey and Fuller, 
1979). The results show that all of the variables are stationary in their level 
according to the different unit root tests.2 An unrestricted VAR model should 
be applied when the variables are stationary in their levels. 
Table 1 
Panel Unit Root Tests 
Variables Levin, Lin & Chu Im, Pesaran and Shin ADF-Fisher PP-Fisher 
armimp -15.16** -15.49** 436.2** 489.84** 
milex -7.84** -6.85** 210.65** 230.26** 
militpolit -4.27** -4.80** 151.1** 164.46** 
govstabil -7.73** -7.68** 224.94** 190.27** 
polity -1.51* -1.47* 98.86** 106.96** 
exconflict -4.11** -8.07** 248.32** 200.15** 
intconflict -4.48** -6.32** 208.62** 152.78** 
ethnic -11.34** -7.67** 154.44** 132.46** 
religious -7.14** -10.78** 414.79** 97.98** 
armforc -0.92 -1.57* 131.76** 129.97** 
elecdem -2.69** -3.11** 198.83** 238.83** 
liberdem -3.60** -1.79** 161.36** 185.89** 
delibdem -3.87** -3.88** 176.81** 158.88** 
egalitdem -2.41** -2.59** 167.96** 204.07** 
par-
ticipdem 
-1.31* -0.38 119.26** 125.85** 
Note: Automatic lag length selection (Schwarz Information Criteria) is applied. According to the Levin, 
Lin and Chu test the null hypothesis is a unit root which assumes a common unit root process. For the 
other three tests, the null hypothesis is a unit root which supposes an individual unit root process.  
** indicate significance at the 5%. * indicate significance at the 10%. 
 
 
2 Armed forces personnel (as percentage of total labor force) and participatory index 
of democracy are stationary with respect to three tests out of four unit root tests. 
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The ordering of the variables in VAR systems is important as different 
settings may lead to different results within a VAR model. As a common 
strategy, we put the variables with more exogenous natures first and the 
variables with more endogenous characteristics later in our VAR models. A 
sanctioned country’s arms imports depend on the availability of alternative 
external channels from where the target country can import its required 
armaments, rather than relying on domestic production. Hence, arms imports 
shocks, to a great extent, are of an exogenous nature for the sanctioned 
country. We expect that significant shocks in arms imports simultaneously 
influence the other variables in the model. Military expenditures, political and 
conflict indices follow the arms imports in our Cholesky ordering. The 
restrictions on arms imports affect both government expenditures on defence 
and political conditions and this may affect internal and external conflicts in 
target countries. In this study, we first estimate an unrestricted panel-VAR 
model consisting of six variables to test the impact of negative shocks to arms 
imports (as percentage of GDP) on military expenditures (as percentage of 
GDP), political institutions and conflict indices in developing countries. The 
vector of endogenous variables in our first PVAR model is as following: 
 
 Yt= [armimp, milex, militpolit, polity2, exconflict, inconflict]                     (2) 
3.1 Impulse response functions 
The impulse response functions (IRFs) display the impact of a one-time shock 
to arms imports on military expenditures, political institutions and conflict 
indices in VAR model. If the disturbance terms  are contemporaneously 
uncorrelated, the explanation of the estimated impulse response functions is 
straightforward. The ith innovation  is explained as a shock to the ith 
endogenous variable . The confidence bands around the impulse responses 
enable us to assess the statistical significance of them (Runkle, 1987). We 
estimate 68% confidence intervals for the IRFs (see Sims and Zha 1999). In 
the presented IRFs in Figure 1, the middle lines illustrate the response of the 
variables to a one standard deviation negative shock in arms imports (as 
percentage of GDP). The dotted lines represent confidence bands. The 
impulse responses are statistically significant wherever the horizontal line lies 
outside of the two confidence bands. In this case we can reject the null 
hypothesis of “no effects arms imports” on the particular variable (Berument 
et al. 2010). The horizontal line in IRFs shows the time line and the vertical 
line shows the magnitude of responses to shocks.   
The selected number of lags for the variables may also influence the 
PVAR estimations. The statistical criteria such as LR (sequential modified 
Likelihood Ratio test statistic), FPE (final prediction error), AIC (Akaike 
information criterion), SIC (Schwarz information criterion), and HQ (Hannan–
Quinn information criterion) are usually employed to choose the optimal lag 
length in VAR specifications. We choose the lag length of 2 according to the 
SIC and HQ criteria as these are often more parsimonious (Pesaran and Smith, 




Panel VAR Lag order selection criteria 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SIC HQ 
0 -6267.88 - 0.00 11.98 12.01 11.99 
1 -192.05 12070.41 6.30e-08 0.45 0.64 0.52 
2 72.29 522.13 4.07e-08 0.01 0.38* 0.15* 
3 125.05 103.59 3.94e-08 -0.02 0.52 0.18 
4 170.69 89.10* 3.87e-08* -0.04* 0.67 0.23 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion, LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at  
5% level), FPE: Final prediction error, AIC: Akaike information criterion, SC: Schwarz information 
criterion, HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion. 
 
 
Figure 1 provides the panel impulse responses of conflict indices, the 
political situation and military spending as a percentage of GDP to a one 
standard deviation negative shock in arms imports to GDP ratio for a period 
of 1990–2017 among the 48 developing countries. 
The ratio of arms imports to GDP is the first variable in our PVAR 
model, followed by military expenditures as a percentage of GDP, military in 
politics, polity2 index, and internal and external conflict indices. We postulate 
that arms imports (as a % of GDP) is the most exogenous variable in the 
model of arms sanctioned countries and can be used as an index to imitate the 
impact of arms embargo on the political situation and conflict in developing 
countries. Decreases in arms imports (due to arms embargo) impact military 
expenditure, and this may affect the military’s involvement in politics, and 
thereafter the political behavior of the government. Both fluctuations in 
military spending and the political situation may affect internal and external 
conflicts in sanctioned developing countries. 
Figure 1 reveals that the decreases in the arms imports to GDP ratio have 
a negative and statistically significant impact on the military expenditure to 
GDP ratio during the entire period. Also, the arms imports variable responds 
negatively to its own negative shocks due to external sanctions. The responses 
of the military in politics index (for the entire period) and polity2 index (after 2 
years of initial shock) to the negative shocks in arms imports as a percentage of 
GDP are positive and statistically significant. Imposing arms restrictions will 
decrease government spending on the military, and this lowers the military’s 
involvement in politics and improves the political behaviour of government. 
The responses of the external conflict index to decreases in arms imports as a 
percentage of GDP are negative but not significant, while the internal conflict 
index shows negative and marginally significant responses within 3-6 years 
after initial shocks. This indicates that military embargoes are not effective in 
controlling external conflict in developing countries; they may even increase 




















Figure 1 Impulse response functions related to a one standard deviation negative shock in arms 
imports as a percentage of GDP. (a) Response of arms imports as a percentage of GDP. (b) Response 
of military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. (c) Response of military in politics index. (d) 
Response of polity2 index (e) Response of internal conflict.  (f) Response of external conflict.  
Notes: The dotted lines depict ±1 standard deviation. The horizontal axis displays the time periods 
(years) after the initial shock.  
 
Figure 2 









Figure 2 displays the AR graph, which represents the inverse roots of the 
characteristic AR polynomial (see Lütkepohl 1991). According to this figure, all 
roots in the PVAR model are located inside the unit circle and have modulus 
less than one and the PVAR model is stable. 
3.2 Impacts on religious and ethnic tensions 
In Figure 3 we examine the impact of arms embargo on the political situation, 
as well as ethnic and religious tensions in developing countries. We employed 2 
lags as the optimum number of lags in our analysis. The VAR stability 
condition test (roots of characteristic polynomial) indicates that the VAR 
satisfies the stability condition.3 The negative shocks to arms imports as a 
percentage of GDP have negative and statistically significant effects on defence 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP (for the entire period), and positive and 
improving impacts on the indices of military in politics (for the entire period) 
and polity2 (after two years of initial shocks). The response of ethnic tensions 
to the negative shocks in arms imports as a percentage of GDP is negative and 
statistically significant, but the response of religious tensions is not significant.  
These results confirm our previous findings regarding the decreasing impact of 
arms embargoes on military spending as a percentage of GDP and its 
improving impact on political institutions. Decreases in arms imports can 



















Figure 3 Impulse response functions related to a one standard deviation negative shock in arms 
imports as a percentage of GDP. (a) Response of arms imports as a percentage of GDP. (b) Response 
of military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. (c) Response of military in politics index. (d) 
Response of polity2 index (e) Response of religious tensions.  (f) Response of ethnic tensions.  
Notes: The dotted lines depict ±1 standard deviation. The horizontal axis displays the time periods 
(years) after the initial shock.  
3.3 Alternative definitions for democracy index and 
government stability 
For robustness check, we use an alternative new measure of democracy known 
as electoral democracy. This measure is based on data from a large number of 
indices collected through the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (see 
Pemstein et al. 2017). The electoral component of democracy represents the 
core value of making rulers responsive to people through competition for the 
approval of a broad electorate during periodic elections. In the V-Dem 
structure, electoral democracy is the base of any other components of 
representative democracy- liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or 
some other. It ranges from 0 to 1. The higher scores show the better quality of 
electoral democracy (Coppedge et al. 2015, p.3). We also replace the military in 
politics index with the government stability indicator to examine whether the 
arms embargo can destabilize sanctioned governments or not. Furthermore, 
we use ethnic tensions and internal conflict in our panel VAR model presented 
in Figure 4 to show the impacts on conflicts.4 
 
 
4 Internal conflicts and ethnic tensions showed significant responses according to our 
















Figure 4 Impulse response functions related to a one standard deviation negative shock in arms 
imports as a percentage of GDP. a Response of arms imports as a percentage of GDP. b Response of 
military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. c Response of government stability index. d Response of 
electoral democracy index e Response of ethnic tensions.  f Response of internal conflict.  
Notes: The dotted lines depict ±1 standard deviation. The horizontal axis displays the time periods 
(years) after the initial shock.  
 
We apply 2 lags for the variables according to LR, FPE, and HQ criteria. 
The VAR stability condition test verifies the stability of our PVAR model. 
Therefore, the standard errors of the impulse responses are valid. Figure 4 
indicates that a one standard deviation negative shock in arms imports (as 
percentage of GDP) will have negative and statistically significant impact on 
military expenditures (as percentage of GDP) and government stability index, 
but a positive and significant (after one year of initial shock) on the electoral 
democracy index. The responses of ethnic tensions and internal conflicts are 
negative and statistically significant after 2 and 4 years of initial negative shock 
to arms imports respectively. These indicate that arms embargoes may 
destabilize the government by weakening the military sector. This improves the 
quality of democracy but may lead to heightened ethnic tensions and internal 
conflict by undermining the military and destabilizing the central government. 
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3.4 Alternative definitions for negative arms imports shocks 
and military effect 
In figure 5 we estimate a Panel VAR model using the “decreasing arms 
imports” and replace the military expenditures as a percentage of GDP with 
armed forces personnel (as % of total labor force). This will further help us to 
understand how the arms embargo motivates demilitarization by affecting the 
armed forces personnel. Another point is that positive and negative external 
shocks may have asymmetric effects on military, conflict and political system 
(Dizaji et al 2016 and Dizaji 2019a) by creating a ratchet effect. Imposing arms 
embargoes will cause negative shocks on target countries arms imports. 
Therefore, it can be informative to consider asymmetric shocks on arms 
imports to test whether negative changes in this variable affect the political 
situation and conflict indices. For this purpose, we define the decreasing trend 
in arms imports as a shock variable. According to Mork (1994), which offers 
an asymmetric definition of oil price shocks to highlight the differences 
between positive and negative oil shocks, we define the negative changes in the 




SIC and HQ criteria suggest 2 lags for the variables. The Panel VAR 
stability condition test shows that the specified PVAR model is stable. Figure 5 
shows that a one standard deviation shock in the “negative changes” of arms 
imports leads to negative and statistically significant response of armed forces 
personnel and significant improvements in military in politics and polity2 
measures. The responses of ethnic tensions (after second year of initial shock) 
and internal conflict (until the 8th year) are negative and statistically significant. 
These results reveal that negative changes in arms imports due to the arms 
sanctions demilitarize the target country by reducing the number of armed 
forces personnel. This will decrease the military’s involvement in politics and 
improve the quality of electoral democracy. However, weaknesses in the 
military structure due to the sanctions may worsen ethnic tensions and internal 
conflicts in the sanctioned countries.5  
 
5 We have also used the negative shocks to the ratio of arms imports to GDP like 
before (instead of defining the asymmetric shocks to negative changes in the ratio of 
arms imports to GDP). The overall results by and large agree. These results are 
















Figure 5 Impulse response functions related to a one standard deviation shock to negative changes in 
arms imports as a percentage of GDP. (a) Response of arms imports as a percentage of GDP. (b) 
Response of armed forces personnel (% of total labor force). (c) Response of military in politics index. 
(d) Response of electoral democracy. (e) Response of ethnic tensions.  (f) Response of internal conflict. 
Notes: The dotted lines depict ±1 standard deviation. The horizontal axis displays the time periods 
(years) after the initial shock.  
 
3.5 Panel generalized impulse responses including different 
V-DEM democracy indices 
The electoral part is important element of the V-Dem conceptual scheme; 
democratic regimes have necessarily the electoral democracy. However, 
holding elections alone is not sufficient, and also countries may feign 
“democratic features” without having real electoral democracy (Coppedge et al 
2015). We therefore consider other components of democracy that offer 
different ways for defining democracy, i.e. liberal, participatory, deliberative, 
and egalitarian democracy beside electoral democracy.  
- “The liberal part of democracy refers to the intrinsic value of preserving 
individual and minority rights against a potential “tyranny of the majority.” 
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This is obtained through constitutionally preserved strong rule of law, civil 
liberties, and effective checks and balances that restrict the use of executive 
power.  
- The participatory component includes the values of direct rule and active 
participation by citizens in all political procedures; it highlights non-
electoral shapes of political participation such as through civil society 
organizations and mechanisms of direct democracy.  
- The deliberative component includes the core value that political decisions in 
pursuit of the public good should be informed by respectful and reasonable 
dialogue at all levels rather than by solidary attachments, emotional appeals, 
parochial interests, or compulsion.  
- The egalitarian component includes that material and immaterial inequalities 
prevent the actual exercise of formal rights and liberties; then a more equal 
distribution of resources, education and health facilities among different 
groups should improve political equality” (Coppedge et al 2015, p.5).  
Ordering of these democracy indices in the PVAR model is important, and a 
different setting may lead to different panel impulse responses (Dizaji 2019b). 
Generally, theory should guide us to opt for the most suitable ordering so that 
some variables follow the other variables rather than leading them. The panel 
generalized impulse response function (PGIRF) approach, which is based on 
Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), suggests a useful solution 
when the theory is unable to link the variables clearly. The PGIRFs offer an 
orthogonal set of innovations that is not relying on the ordering of the 
variables in the Panel VAR system. Accordingly, we test the panel generalized 
impulse responses of the introduced democracy indices (i.e., electoral, 
participatory, liberal, deliberative, and egalitarian democracies), and arms 
imports as a as a percentage of GDP to a one standard deviation shock to 
asymmetric negative changes in arms imports as a as a percentage of GDP.  
According to Figure 6 the responses of electoral democracy, egalitarian 
democracy, liberal democracy, deliberative democracy, and finally participatory 
democracy indices to the negative changes in arms imports as a percentage of 
GDP are positive and statistically significant during the entire period.6 The 
overall results indicate that the restrictions on arms imports will encourage all 
electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian democracy indices 




6 We have also alternatively investigated the generalized impulse response functions of 
different components of democracy to negative shocks in ratio of arms imports in 
GDP (rather than the shocks to the asymmetric negative changes in arms imports to 
GDP ratio). The overall results confirm previous findings implying that arms embargo 
has positive impact on different components of democracy in developing countries. 
















Figure 6 Impulse response functions related to a one standard deviation shock to negative changes in 
arms imports as a percentage of GDP. (a) Response of arms imports as a percentage of GDP. (b) 
Response of electoral democracy. (c)  Response of egalitarian democracy. (d)  Response of liberal 
democracy. (e)  Response of deliberative democracy. (f)  Response of participatory democracy.  
Notes: The dotted lines depict ±1 standard deviation. The horizontal axis displays the time periods 
(years) after the initial shock. 
  
3.6 The impact on government non-military expenditures 
and growth 
The arms embargo may influence non-military expenditures (such as education 
expenditures and health expenditures), besides their impact on military 
expenditures. In figure 7 we have replaced military burden with education 
expenditures (as percentage of GDP). We examine the impact of one standard 
deviation negative shocks in arms imports on education expenditures (as 
percentage of GDP), as well as political and conflict indices for 32 developing 
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countries over the period of 1990-2017.7 The results show that arms 
embargoes increases education expenditures (as percentage of GDP) and 
improves political indices while it intensifies ethnic tensions and internal 
conflict in developing countries. We have also applied health expenditures (as 
percentage of GDP) as well as general government total expenditures (as 
percentage of GDP) alternatively and in different PVAR models. The results 
show that arms embargoes have positive and statistically significant impact on 
health expenditures8 (as a percentage of GDP) while its impact on general 
government total expenditures (as percentage of GDP) is negative and 















7 Due to the lack of consistent data on education expenditures, we have decreased the 
number countries to 32 developing countries for the mentioned period.  
8 Our time period decreases to 2000-2017 when we use health expenditures (as 
percentage of GDP) in PVAR model.  







Figure 7 Impulse response functions related to a one standard deviation negative shock in arms 
imports as a percentage of GDP. (a) Response of arms imports as a percentage of GDP. (b) Response 
of government education expenditures as a percentage of GDP. (c) Response of military in politics 
index. (d) Response of polity2 index  (e) Response of ethnic tensions. (f) Response of internal conflict.  
Notes: The dotted lines depict ±1 standard deviation. The horizontal axis displays the time periods 
(years) after the initial shock.  
 
Figure 8 illustrates the responses of the military burden, political 
development, economic development (captured by GDP per capita), as well as 
conflict variables to arms embargoes. According to this figure, the response of 
GDP per capita to negative shocks in arms imports is positive and statistically 
significant.10 The responses of others variables confirm our previous findings. 
Therefore, arms embargo decreases military burden and may improve political 
and economic development in sanctioned countries. However, decreases in the 










10 We have also included GDP per capita in other PVAR models using education 
expenditures or health expenditures or government expenditures instead of military 
expenditures. We found the positive response of GDP per capita to negative shocks 
















Figure 8 Impulse response functions related to a one standard deviation negative shock in arms 
imports as a percentage of GDP. (a) Response of arms imports as a percentage of GDP. (b) Response 
of military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. (c) Response of military in politics index. (d) 
Response of electoral democracy index (e) Response of GDP per capita. (f) Response of ethnic 
tensions. (g) Response of internal conflict.  
Notes: The dotted lines depict ±1 standard deviation. The horizontal axis displays the time periods 
(years) after the initial shock.  
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4  Conclusions 
This study simulates the impact of arms embargo on military expenditures, 
democracy indices and conflict variables in developing countries for the period 
of 1990-2017. The results of impulse responses functions based on the 
estimated PVAR models reveal that negative shocks in arms imports make 
negative impact on military expenditures and armed forces personnel, decrease 
military involvement in politics and improve democracy indices. However, 
arms embargoes may intensify ethnic tensions and internal conflicts in 
developing countries through reducing central government military power and 
destabilizing the government. This may be because sanctions increase the 
degree of factionalism in society and exacerbate existing inequalities. Another 
reason could be that many countries are at an early stage of their democratic 
transition. Hegre et. Al (2001) indicate that conflict risk is lowest in both 
established autocracies and democracies. As many developing countries have 
only experienced democracy recently, improvements in democratic credentials 
can, at least initially, trigger pent up tensions and ethnic conflict.   
The responses of political system and different indices of democracy 
including electoral, participatory, deliberative, liberal, and egalitarian democracy 
to decreases in arms imports are positive and statistically significant. This is 
one of the innovations of our paper, as we are able to separate liberal and 
electoral aspects of democracy and capture smaller and more continuous 
alterations in democratic quality. Furthermore, our findings show that while 
arms restrictions decrease military burden and general government total 
expenditures (as percentage of GDP), their impact on education expenditures 
(as percentage of GDP), health expenditures (as percentage of GDP) and GDP 
per capita are positive and statistically significant. This indicates that arms 
embargoes may substitute non-military expenditures (such as education and 
health expenditures) for military expenditures, and this can counter the 
negative impact of military expenditures on economic growth and political 
development in developing countries. These results are robust to different 
approaches of defining the negative arms shocks, and different measurements 
of political conditions (V-DEM democracy indices and polity2), as well as 
different orderings of variables in the PVAR models.  
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